FEDERATED AUTHENTICATION SERVICE

TECHNICAL FIELD

5   The present invention relates generally to secure use of computerized networks, and more particularly to efficiently maintaining security in information systems when multiple authentication types and sources are used.

BACKGROUND ART

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In today's digital world, information systems and their contents are among the most valuable of an organization's assets. Every year organizations spend significant amounts of money to protect their data from unauthorized access. Simultaneously, organizations have an overarching business requirement to share information with their partners, customers, suppliers, and even in some cases competitors and adversaries. This requires authentication.

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The greatest value in authentication is when it forms the basis for enforcing access control rules. That is, in order for a system to determine what a subject can do the system must first ascertain who the subject is.

Traditional authentication systems generally presume a single authentication source and type. For example, in Kerberos the authentication source is a trusted key distribution center (KDC) and the authentication type is user IDs with passwords. [Version five of Kerberos supports initial authentication based on public keys, but a high percentage of commercial implementations of Kerberos authenticate based on a user ID and a password.] Another example is the public key infrastructure (PKI) system. Here the authentication source is a certificate

25   authority (CA) and the authentication type is challenge/response. While both Kerberos and PKI permit multiple authentication sources, these authentication sources must be closely coupled. Often, this translates to complex trust relationships between the sources of authentication, which leads to solutions that are operationally infeasible and economically cost-prohibitive.

An emerging authentication system, and one which has particular importance later in this

30   discussion is the secure remote password (SRP) protocol. In the words of SRP's advocates, inventor Tom Wu and Stanford University, "it solves the problem of authenticating clients to

servers securely, in cases where the client must memorize a small secret (like a password) and carries no other secret information, and where the server carries a verifier which allows it to authenticate the client but which, if compromised, would not allow someone to impersonate the client." But SRP, like traditional authentication systems, also presumes a single authentication source and type.

A practical view of inter- and intra-organization communication reveals that there can never be a single authentication type. In fact, according to a report published in February 2001 by the Giga Group, companies will be supporting multiple authentication types, such as passwords, tokens, certificates and smart cards. Therefore, security architectures should include a single infrastructure for managing all of the authentication types, rather than a separate infrastructure for each. Even if there someday is a single authentication type (e.g. biometrics), there will always be multiple authentication sources, each having administrative control over a set of subjects.

It follows that information systems that seek to enforce access control must be prepared to accept authentication information from any number of sources. Indeed, key criteria for enforcing access control include the exact source and type of authentication. In a practical model the many authentication sources need to form a federation, each of whose members can ascertain the authenticity of a set of subjects.

What is needed is a technology that permits organizations to leverage authentication sources that belong to themselves, or to their customers, partners, suppliers, or any other third party. We can term such a technology a Federated Authentication Service Technology (FAST), and define its goal to be to enable organizations to quickly implement their business relationships through highly secure information systems.

DISCLOSURE OF INVENTION

Accordingly, it is an object of the present invention to provide a Federated Authentication Service Technology (FAST), to enable organizations to quickly implement their business

5   relationships through highly secure information systems.

Another object of the invention is to provide an authentication system which permits the use of multiple authentication types and multiple authentication sources from different domains of control.

Another object of the invention is to provide an authentication system which permits an

10   organization to change its authentication mechanism without affecting its users or servers.

Another object of the invention is to provide an authentication system which provides stringent security requirements while leveraging an organizations existing security infrastructure to quickly implement business relationships.

And another object of the invention is to provide an authentication system which permits

15   users and service providers to choose where to authenticate.

Briefly, one preferred embodiment of the present invention is a system for authenticating a subject residing in a subject domain on a network to a server application residing in a server domain on the network when an authentication mechanism residing in an authentication domain on the network affects the service provided by the server application. The system includes a

20   client to communicate with other components and to authenticate the subject by providing a client name assertion on behalf of the subject. The client also resides in the subject domain. The system further includes a protocol proxy to communicate between the client and the authentication mechanism and authenticate the client based on the client credentials, and to create from the client credentials an authentication name assertion allowing the client to access

25   the server application.

An advantage of the present invention is that it permits multiple authentication types and sources by effectively abstracting these. Existing authentication technologies allow multiple authentication types (e.g., user id/password, biometrics, digital certificates, etc.). However, these existing technologies do not abstract multiple authentication sources (e.g., employer, financial

30   institution, healthcare provider, etc.).

Another advantage of the invention is that it can authenticate with any mechanism server

may choose. The authenticating mechanism of a server is completely independent of that of a client.

Another advantage of the invention is that it permits flexible credential expiration, requested by the client, the server application, or the authentication mechanism.

Another advantage of the invention is that it supports authentication from different domains, permitting a single, global sign-on.

Another advantage of the invention is that it provides a single location for managing credentials, providing easy administration and enabling the deployment of highly secure systems.

Another advantage of the invention is that it employs a highly secure inter-component protocol. This enables many different deployment scenarios and provides a basis for managed security services.

Another advantage of the invention is that it is authentication mechanism agnostic. It can protect an organization's investment in existing authentication mechanisms, yet permit seamless integration of future authentication mechanisms.

Another advantage of the invention is that it permits a hierarchy of trust. The invention requires authenticating mechanisms to authenticate themselves. In this manner a user need only reveal sensitive credentials to authentic mechanisms. Furthermore, a server application need only trust assertions of an authentic mechanism.

Another advantage of the invention is that it permits production and verification of signatures using Name Assertions. This eliminates the need to use digital certificates for production and verification of signatures, which improves the speed and efficiency of signature production and verification.

Another advantage of the invention is that it allows name assertions to be used as a basis to renew an existing name assertion. This eliminates the need to use digital certificates every time authentication is needed, which improves on the speed and efficiency of the authentication process.

Another advantage of the invention is that it is standards compliant. It promotes interoperability between applications and current and emerging security systems.

Another advantage of the invention is that it may employ and enhance the utility of the public key infrastructure (PKI) scheme. The invention turns long-lived digital certificates into ephemeral certificates (name assertions) therefore minimizing overall management and

overhead. Specifically, the invention eliminates the need for servers to check certificate revocation lists (CRLs), a process that has plagued the proliferation of PKI.

Another advantage of the invention is that it may employ and enhance the utility of Kerberos, where the client has had to communicate with the Kerberos authentication mechanism every time the client contacts a specific server for the first time. Name assertions, as used by the present invention, are general and can be used to prove identity to any server. Therefore, a single valid name assertion can be presented to any server. This eliminates the need for the client to contact the authenticating mechanism every time it wants to communicate with a different server.

Another advantage of the invention is that it may employ and enhance the utility of secure remote password (SRP). SRP enables authentication of a client to a server, but it does not strongly authenticate the server to the client. The invention improves on this by implementing a strong, mutual authentication protocol.

Another advantage of the invention is that it permits a graceful migration path, unlike existing authentication technologies which require all user and servers to be enabled with that technology and which result in an all- or-none proposition for the entire enterprise. Using the present invention, an organization can change its authentication mechanism without affecting its users or servers.

And another advantage of the invention is that it is lightweight, its architecture permits a very lightweight implementation making it suitable for a wide variety of deployment scenarios.

These and other objects and advantages of the present invention will become clear to those skilled in the art in view of the description of the best presently known mode of carrying out the invention and the industrial applicability of the preferred embodiment as described herein and as illustrated in the several figures of the drawings.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The purposes and advantages of the present invention will be apparent from the following detailed description in conjunction with the appended figures of drawings in which:

5   FIG. 1 is a block diagram depicting how the invention includes a set of cooperating components which execute in different administrative domains;

FIG. 2 is a block diagram depicting an example of how the invention may be applied by two companies for collaboration in the development of a new product;

FIG. 3 is a block diagram depicting an example of how the invention may be applied by

10   an outside managed security services provider (MSSP) to provide authentication for customers; and

FIG. 4 is a block diagram that also depicts how the invention includes a number of interacting components, expanding on FIG. 1 by also showing various options and usage with multiple authentication mechanisms.

BEST MODE FOR CARRYING OUT THE INVENTION

A preferred embodiment of the present invention is a Federated Authentication Service

Technology (FAST). As illustrated in the various drawings herein, and particularly in the view of

5   FIG. 1, a preferred embodiment of the invention is depicted by the general reference character

10. To assist in understanding the following discussion, a glossary is also provided after the

Industrial Applicability section.

FIG. 1 depicts how FAST **10** includes a set of cooperating components which execute

across different administrative domains in a network, with the boundaries depicted here with

10   dashed lines. Thus, a subject domain **12** is stylistically depicted as bordering an agent domain **14**,

an authentication domain **16**, and a server domain **18**. The subject domain **12** includes a subject

20 (not necessarily human) and a client application or applet (client **22**). The agent domain **14**

includes an authentication agent **24**, a mechanism resolution process **26**, a mechanism repository

28, and a mechanism registration process **30**. The authentication domain **16** includes an

15   authentication mechanism **32** and a protocol proxy **34** (which may alternately reside in the

authentication domain **16**). The server domain **18** includes a server application **38**.

From the subject domain **12** it is desired to obtain access to the server domain **18**. Such

access is predicated upon a successful authentication in the authentication domain **16**, and the

agent domain **14** facilitates the authentication. FIG. 1 and this description are simplified,

20   somewhat, to present key points but, as will be described presently, in typical embodiments the

FAST **10** will include a number of subjects **20**, authentication mechanisms **32**, and server

applications **38**, all employing the services of one authentication agent **24**. When multiple

entities of a similar type are present, they are each treated as respective domains.

Before describing FIG. 1 in more detail it will help to appreciate the role in FAST **10** of a

25   core concept called "name assertion." A name assertion is a type of credential. More specifically,

in actual implementation, it is a digitally signed data structure containing a declaration of identity

which is presentable to establish a claimed identity.

FAST **10** preferably uses the secure remote password (SRP) protocol to authenticate an

entity that presents a name assertion. In FAST **10** this is accomplished by including an SRP

30   verifier in the name assertion, and then providing the SRP secret to the entity that must

authenticate itself. Thus, for example, when a client **22** presents a name assertion to a server

application **38**, the server application **38** retrieves the SRP verifier from the name assertion and uses the SRP scheme to challenge the client **22** to prove possession of the SRP secret.

Turning now to a detailed description of FIG. 1, it depicts the overall flow of authentication in FAST **10**. A series of steps, steps **40-52**, encompass the actual authentication process and, generally but not always, occur every time a subject **20** must be authenticated to a server application **38**. In contrast, steps **56-58** encompass a registration process that only need occur when an authentication mechanism **32** registers or updates itself to the agent domain **14** (changes the mechanism repository **28**).

In step **40** the subject **20**, who must authenticate itself, uses the client **22** to initiate the process of obtaining access to the server application **38**. It should be noted that while the client **22** here is shown as distinct from the subject **20**, that need not be the case if the subject **20** can have the functionality of the client **22** integrated into it, say, if the subject **20** is non-human.

In step **42** the client **22** contacts the authentication agent **24** and passes to it the name of the subject **20** and their domain. The client **22** can, optionally, also send the name of a particular authentication mechanism **32** and other data (typically including method and strength of authentication which the authentication mechanism can provide, if pertinent). A successful interaction between the client **22** and the authentication agent **24** produces information about exactly one authentication mechanism **32** for the client **22** to use. Otherwise, the authentication agent **24** returns an error condition indicating that no authentication mechanism **32** matches the request by the client **22**.

In step **44** the authentication agent **24** uses the mechanism resolution process **26** to determine an appropriate authentication mechanism **32** for the client **22**. If there is more than one which is appropriate, the authentication agent **24** uses its protocol with the client **22** (step **42** above) to resolve to exactly one authentication mechanism **32**.

In step **46** the mechanism resolution process **26** uses the mechanism repository **28** to retrieve information about appropriate authentication mechanisms **32**. This information could then be passed back to the client **22** for final mechanism resolution.

In step **48** the client **22** communicates an authentication request for access to the server application **38** to the protocol proxy **34** using a standard secure protocol. It should be noted that this need not go via the authentication agent **24** or any part of the agent domain **14** (but that it may optionally do so, being passed-thru in a manner described presently).

In step **50** the protocol proxy **34** receives the authentication request from the client **22** and translates it into the native protocol of the authentication mechanism **32**. Consequently, there can be one protocol proxy **34** for each type of authentication mechanism **32**. The protocol proxy **34** next communicates the translated request to the authentication mechanism **32**. Upon successful

5   authentication, the protocol proxy **34** receives back from the authentication mechanism **32** a response including attributes and access rights of the subject **20**. The protocol proxy **34** then creates a name assertion and, optionally, entitlements. The protocol proxy **34** translates this into an authentication response which it transmits back to the client **22**.

In step **52** the client **22** delivers the authentication response to the server application **38**.

10   The client **22** and the server application **38** then engage in a protocol that proves the client **22** is the proper owner of the name assertion.

As noted, the above steps **40-52** generally (but not always) occur every time a subject **20** must authenticate itself to a server application **38**. To the extent that name assertions are re-usable, the subject **20** can present it to any server application **38**, any number of times. To

15   initially register an authentication mechanism **32** the following steps **56-58** are used.

In step **56** the authentication mechanism **32** contacts the mechanism registration process **30** to initiate registration.

In step **58** the mechanism registration process **30** enters information about the authentication mechanism **32** into the mechanism repository **28**, and thereafter the steps **40-52**

20   may be employed. The protocol proxy **34** may already be available to the authentication mechanism **32**, or it can be provided or made available by the mechanism registration process **30** during these registration steps.

Each of the components of FAST **10** has a protocol which it employs when communicating with the others within FAST **10**. The subject **20** uses an environment-specific

25   device to authenticate itself. FAST **10** is environment-agnostic, so a subject **20** may authenticate in any environment using any type of credential. Some examples of such credentials include user ID/passwords on a computer or a hand-held device, digital certificates and an associated private key, and biometric data such as a fingerprint or iris-scan.

The client **22** is an application or an applet that helps the subject **20** authenticate itself.

30   The clients **22** run in environment-specific platforms and interact with devices that produce the necessary credentials. For example, a client **22** may interact with a biometric device to gather

fingerprint data.

The subject **20** may obtain the client **22** in a number of different manners. For example, it may be pre-provisioned with the client **22** or it may down load it "on the fly" from the authentication agent **24**, the server application **38**, or elsewhere.

5   As was noted above, the client **22** interacts with the authentication agent **24** in order to determine the most appropriate authentication mechanism **32**. The authentication agent **24** can return more than one appropriate authentication mechanism **32**. The client **22** therefore may have a callback mechanism to enable local determination of exactly which authentication mechanism **32** it should use. For example, the callback mechanism can interact with the subject **20** to

10   determine this or it may consult a configuration repository.

The authentication agent **24** brokers between the client **22** and the mechanism resolution process **26**. The client **22** must minimally send the authentication agent **24** the name and the domain of the subject **20**, but it may optionally also send other information. The authentication agent **24** uses this information to resolve to an appropriate authentication mechanism **32**. The authentication agent **24** then returns information identifying authentication mechanisms **32** to the client **22**. If more that one is supplied, the client **22** uses its callback mechanism to select exactly one.

A specific scenario provided for is when the client **22** chooses the authentication mechanism **32** without the help of the authentication agent **24**. For example, the client **22**, through its interaction with the subject **20** may choose an authentication mechanism **32**. In this case the client **22** has two choices. First, the client **22** may send a request for the specific authentication mechanism **32** it desires to the authentication agent **24**. Subsequently, the authentication agent **24** merely checks to ensure that the authentication mechanism **32** can indeed authenticate the subject **20**. Second, the client **22** may directly contact the protocol proxy **34** to

25   start the authentication process with the authentication mechanism **32**, and thus effectively bypass the mechanism resolution process **26**.

The mechanism resolution process **26** is a "black-box" process. In the preferred embodiment, it receives an input document in XML format and produces a list of zero or more appropriate authentication mechanisms **32**. The input document minimally consists of the name

30   of the subject **20** and their domain. The input document can be expanded to include any other data (e.g., an authentication strength) that can help choose the set of authentication mechanisms

32. For instance, consider a subject **20**, John Doe, who has a work account at "A.com," and various other accounts with "B.com," "C.com," etc. Mr. Doe may need to access the resources of Z.com in his work capacity, and therefore needs to authenticate as "JohnDoe@A.com." This will require resolution to an appropriate authentication mechanism **32** for Z.com, for instance, may be

5　set up with a mask "*@A.com" to direct resource requests to use a particular authentication mechanism **32**.

The mechanism repository **28** is a database that contains information about authentication mechanisms **32**. It should be noted that a "mechanism" specifies exactly how to contact and work with the protocol proxy **34** of each authentication mechanism **32**, e.g., what URL to use to reach

10　it, etc. The mechanism resolution process **26** and the mechanism registration process **30** use the mechanism repository **28** to resolve and to register the authentication mechanisms **32**, respectively.

The mechanism registration process **30** is what the authentication mechanisms **32** use to register themselves or to modify information about themselves in the mechanism repository **28**.

15　As compared to authentication, the mechanism registration process **30** happens infrequently.

Each protocol proxy **34** mediates between its authentication mechanism **32** and the clients **22**. In the preferred embodiment, the protocol proxies **34** use a standard security protocol expressed in XML to communicate with the clients **22**, and a mechanism-specific protocol to communicate with their respective authentication mechanisms **32**. At the end of a successful

20　authentication, a protocol proxy **34** produces a signed document including a name assertion and, optionally, an entitlement. Examples are provided in Appendix A.

Each protocol proxy **34** must itself be authentic and have a valid name assertion. In this manner, the client **22** has to only reveal sensitive credentials to an authentic protocol proxy **34**. Moreover, a server application **38** has to only trust name assertions that are produced by an

25　authentic protocol proxy **34**. A protocol proxy **34** therefore uses its own name assertion to authenticate to a client **22** and to sign the name assertions and entitlements which it produces on behalf of its authentication mechanism **32**. (This is described further, below.)

The authentication mechanism **32** is a process that authenticates a subject **20** according to a specific protocol. Note, however, the protocol proxy **34** hides the specific protocol of the

30　authentication mechanism **32** used for this from the subject **20** and the client **22**. Thus, the authentication mechanism **32** may be entirely conventional, yet still be able to function with an

overall scheme of multiple authentication types and sources, that being a major benefit provided by the inventive FAST **10**.

Each name assertion contains a SRP verifier. The rightful owner of the name assertion possesses the corresponding SRP secret. Using the SRP verifier and the SRP secret, any two parties can authenticate each other using the SRP protocol. In FAST **10** the SRP protocol is extended to enable mutual authentication between any two parties (e.g. client **22** and server application **38**, client **22** and protocol proxy **34**, etc.).

Each name assertion contains a set of public values. In FAST **10** the use of these public values is extended for signature verification. That is, the owner of the name assertion can use its SRP secret to authenticate itself and to produce a digital signature. The party to whom the owner presents the name assertion can then use it to authenticate the owner and to verify the digital signature of the owner.

Because the name assertion itself is signed by the protocol proxy **34** that produces it, the signature of the owner is bound to its authenticated identity. Additionally, because name assertions are ephemeral, there is no requirement for certificate revocation lists (CRL). Note that an authentication mechanism **32** that uses digital certificates to authenticate its subjects **20** can trivially set the name assertion validity period to coincide with the production of the next CRL. In this manner the subject **20** must re-authenticate itself on or before the publication of the next CRL.

The clients **22** need to trust the protocol proxies **34** (which represent the authentication mechanisms **32**). This is especially true in the case of a protocol proxy **34** that receives secret credentials from a client **22**. The protocol proxies **34** therefore authenticate themselves to a mechanism-authenticating mechanism. This type of authentication is identical to a client **22** authenticating with any authentication mechanism **32**. The result is a name assertion that the protocol proxy **34** uses to engage in mutual authentication with the client **22** and to sign name assertions for the clients **22** it authenticates.

When a protocol proxy **34** authenticates with a mechanism-authenticating mechanism, it receives a name assertion in the same manner that any client **22** would. Such a name assertion is signed by the mechanism-authenticating mechanism (or, more precisely, by the protocol proxy **34** ahead of the mechanism-authenticating mechanism that mediates between the protocol proxy **34** needing to be authenticated, i.e., itself temporarily acting in the role of a client **22**). A client

22 can verify the digital signature of the name assertion of the protocol proxy **34** to ascertain its authenticity, as provided by the mechanism-authenticating mechanism. This is similar to verifying a chain of digital certificates, except that in this case, name assertions and certificates are combined to provide a practical solution where all parties need not have digital certificates

5 (only the mechanism-authenticating mechanism would need a digital certificate).

Recall that the client **22** first establishes contact with the protocol proxy **34**. In actual implementation it would be very beneficial if the client **22** can view the authentication agent **24** as the protocol proxy **34**. This is, in fact, possible in FAST **10**, with the reason for that being that the protocol proxy **34** and the client **22** can establish a mutually authenticated session whose

10 protocol data is completely hidden from any process that acts as a pass-thru. That is, the authentication agent **24** can act as a transparent protocol proxy **34**. In this case, the authentication agent **24** acts as a pass-thru. This provides convenience and efficiency for the client **22**, which behaves as if it is dealing with one server (the authentication agent **24**), while preserving the overall security of the authentication process.

15 In FAST **10** authentication types and sources are abstracted. It is therefore possible to develop protocol proxies **34** that can facilitate the authentication of any subject **20** with any authentication mechanism **32**. Four authentication types and their implementations in FAST **10** are now described.

The first implementation to consider uses a user ID and secret credentials. This is a

20 variation on the most popular form of authentication employed today. Here, the user (subject **20**) presents a secret credential to the protocol proxy **34**. The secret credential could, for instance, be a password or biometric data.

FAST **10** implements this authentication type by establishing a secret link between the protocol proxy **34** and the client **22**. This secret link is irrespective of any other communication

25 intermediaries. That is, a process that is acting as pass-thru between the client **22** and the protocol proxy **34** cannot discern the data.

The client **22** and the protocol proxy **34** establish the secure link as follows. First, the client initiates a dialog with the protocol proxy **34**. Second, the protocol proxy **34** presents its own name assertion to the client **22**. Third, the client **22** uses the verifier in the name assertion it

30 receives to authenticate the protocol proxy **34** via the SRP method. Fourth, the client **22** and the protocol proxy **34** establish a secured link via the SRP method.

Once the client **22** establishes the secured link with the protocol proxy **34**, it delivers the credentials and, upon successful authentication, receives a name assertion from the protocol proxy **34**.

The second implementation to consider uses verifier-based authentication. In this form of authentication the client **22** proves possession of a secret credential to the protocol proxy **34**. The protocol proxy **34** has a verifier that matches the secret credentials of the client **22**. In the preferred embodiment of FAST **10** this authentication type is implemented using SRP with mutual authentication (as discussed above).

The third implementation to consider uses digital certificates in a PKI scheme. Authentication using digital certificates does not require a secret link. The protocol proxy **34** uses a standard challenge/response protocol to prove possession of private key by the client **22**. Upon successful authentication, the client **22** receives a name assertion from the protocol proxy **34**.

The fourth implementation to consider uses a previously issued name assertion. Each name assertion contains a verifier whose corresponding secret is maintained by the owner of the name assertion (i.e., the client **22**). A client **22** who has a valid name assertion authenticates with the protocol proxy **34** using SRP with mutual authentication.

While the above generally summarizes the invention, FAST **10** may incorporate additional capabilities. One of these is strength of authentication. A client **22** can specify the strength with which it wants to authenticate itself. This data is an input to the mechanism resolution process **26**. Conversely, each name assertion has a strength indicator, which indicates to a server application **38** the strength with which the subject **20** actually authenticated itself. The clients **22** can specify other environmental variables as part of the request to authenticate. These variables are input to the mechanism resolution process **26**. The name assertions have an expiration time, but a client **22** can renew its name assertion if it can prove ownership of it, and if the renewal count or time period in the original name assertion permits further renewal.

FAST **10** does not require special provisions for authenticating to multiple mechanisms. Instead, this capability is implemented by simply requiring that the client **22** authenticate with each authentication mechanism **32** and receive a separate name assertion.

Two examples of embodiments of FAST **10** are now provided. Each is a practical (but different) deployment scenario. Co-operating partners requiring cross-organization

authentication is the context of the first example.

FIG. 2 is a block diagram depicting the inventive FAST **10** in use by two companies collaborating with each other on the development of a new product, AliCo **112** and Zyland **114** (any similarity to actual businesses is purely coincidental). AliCo **112** and Zyland **114** are

5 represented as regions lying on respective sides of an administrative control boundary **116**. Both companies have employees, stylistically shown respectively as an a-employee **118** and a z-employee **120** (instances of the subject **20** of FIG. 1; the presence of clients, etc. is also implicit here, since humans cannot directly access information systems). These employees **118, 120** collectively form a project team **122**.

10 For this example, we presume that the relationship between AliCo **112** and Zyland **114** is not a permanent one, but that they do have an extremely tight product development cycle. Accordingly, for the duration of the project the members of the project team **122** require access to the information system of their partner company. That is, the a-employee **118** and the z-employee **120** need to use the tools of both companies, stylistically shown as an a-application **124** and a z-application **126**.

AliCo **112** has an a-authentication mechanism **128** and Zyland **114** has a z-authentication mechanism **130** (instances of the authentication mechanism **32** of FIG. 1). These authenticate the company's respective users (employees **118, 120** and potentially many others not pertinent to this example). The a-authentication mechanism **128** used by AliCo **112** is an LDAP directory with user IDs and passwords. In contrast, the z-authentication mechanism **130** used by Zyland **114** is digital certificates and associated certificate revocation lists (CRL). Additionally, both AliCo **112** and Zyland **114** use their own internal systems to manage the entitlements of their respective employees.

Existing solutions to this problem would require one or more of the following: the

25 members of the project team **122** individually registering with the authentication mechanism **128, 130** of the partner company; the members of the project team **122** having a set of entitlements in the repository of the partner company; and the software tools (applications **124, 126**) in both companies understanding the authentication protocol of the partner company (e.g., the applications must be PKI-enabled or Kerberized).

30 This quickly becomes unwieldy. When one company revokes the credentials or changes the entitlements of an employee it must promptly inform its partner. The partner must then

promptly reflect that change in its own repository. Changing the software tools, either by outright addition or by upgrade, also may be effected.

Allegedly simpler solutions would require each member of the project team **122** to obtain a digital certificate from a commonly trusted certificate authority (CA). However, even if digital

5   certificates could be obtained and managed easily, such certificates cannot practically store entitlement information. For example, any modifications to the entitlement would invalidate the certificate. This is why there are long-lived identity certificates and short-lived attribute certificates in the PKI scheme, and why more than 99% of all certificates in use today are identity certificates.

10   Now consider the solution using FAST **10**, as depicted in FIG. 2. AliCo **112** and Zyland **114** would deploy small software protocol proxies **132, 134** (i.e., instances of the protocol proxy **34** of FIG. 1) at their authentication source, and a standard XML adapter **136, 138** in front of their applications **124, 126** (for this example we presume that the applications **124, 126** are not able to directly handle name assertions and need the adapter **136, 138** for this). Immediately

15   thereafter, the a-application **124** of AliCo **112** will recognize the z-employee **120** of Zyland **114**, and can determine his or her entitlements. And the reverse is also true. If one company revokes the credentials or changes the entitlements of one its users, the other company will know it as soon as the next authentication attempt occurs.

Before closing with FIG. 2, it should be noted that it depicts a simple embodiment of the

20   inventive FAST **10**, in that no equivalent of the agent domain **14** and its components is depicted. Since the employees **118, 120** on the project team **122** here are only accessing the applications **124, 126** of the partner company, they will easily know the respective authentication mechanism **128, 130** need and not require the assistance of an agent in resolving one.

Many organizations today are outsourcing their security services to outside managed

25   security services providers (MSSPs). The challenge of MSSPs then is to streamline their operation and realize the economy of scales. This provides the context of the next example.

FIG. 3 is a block diagram depicting the inventive FAST **10** providing authentication for a MSSP **210**. In this second example, the MSSP **210** needs to support several types of authentication types across several hundreds of customers **212** (entities including instances of the

30   subject **20** of FIG. 1). While the MSSP **210** wants to manage the authentication process, it does not want to be the source of authentication. Nor does it want to be in a position to see sensitive

credentials (e.g., passwords). This provides a number of benefits to the MSSP **210** and its customers **212**. The MSSP **210** can support any customer **212**, even those with extremely high security requirements. It can also provide an incremental solution, migrating customers **212** from a minimally managed to a totally managed solution. Not having to see credentials also reduces the legal liabilities of the MSSP **210** arising from any security breaches. It also helps the MSSP **210** to a void costly implementations of chain-of-trust rules.

Legacy solutions to this problem require that the MSSP **210** set up a completely separate and trusted system for each customer **212**. The MSSP **210** must then protect each system with the rigor that meets the demands and expectations of each customer **212**. Most importantly, the solution is all-or-none, inhibiting an incremental deployment.

Now consider the solution with FAST **10**, as depicted in FIG. 2. The MSSP **210** can deploy a single authentication engine **214** for managing authentication for all of its customers **212**. The actual authentication source can be at the customer **212**, at the MSSP **210**, or at a third place (e.g., the authentication domains **216** shown). In fact, the authentication source can move its location and change its administrative authority (from the customer **212** to the MSSP **210** or vice versa) with no effort at all.

In the example in FIG. 3, the authentication sources (paired instances of the protocol proxy **34** and the authentication mechanism **32** of FIG. 1) are depicted as being at a third place. This arrangement has deliberately been used in FIG. 1 and FIG. 3 to emphasize the fact, and the ability of FAST **10** to accommodate that fact, that the authentication sources may be quite removed from the users and tools (instances of the subject **20** and server application **38** of FIG. 1).

Turning now to FIG. 4, a summary of FAST **10** is now discussed. The word "federated" has two specific meanings herein: a system is federated if it supports multiple authentication types, and multiple authentication sources. Prior art approaches address multiple authentication types but largely ignore multiple authentication sources. Thus, the resulting products can support many authentication types for a single organization but cannot support inter-organization authentication. In this discussion we use the word "mechanism" to refer to a specific authentication type at a specific authentication source.

FIG. 4 is a block diagram that again depicts how FAST **10** includes a number of interacting components, extending somewhat on FIG. 1. A subject **312** is the entity that needs to

authenticate itself (user, device, etc.; again the presence of a client is implicit here, and one may even be integrated into a non-human subject **312**). A server application **314** provides service to the subject **312**. In order to do so the server application **314** must know the authenticated identity of the subject **312**, and possibly the entitlements of the subject **312**. A mechanism registration

5   module **316** performs the process that binds the authentication mechanisms **318a, 318b, 318c** to the subjects **312** (e.g., all users at alico.com must authenticate against ldapserver.alico.com). A mechanism repository **320** is the database that holds information about mechanisms such as their location, type, credentials (e.g., a digital certificate), and protocol. A mechanism resolution module **322** performs the process that resolves the name of a subject **312** to one or more

10   mechanisms. An authentication agent **324** is the process that finds the proper authentication mechanism and facilitates the authentication protocol between the subject **312** and a protocol proxy **326a, 326b, 326c**. The protocol proxies **326a, 326b, 326c** are the interface between the authentication agent **324** and the authentication mechanisms **318a, 318b, 318c**.

There is one protocol proxy per specific authentication type (e.g., and LDAP user

15   ID/Password proxy). The protocol proxy can co-reside with either the authentication mechanism or the authentication agent, resulting in possible different deployment scenarios. An authentication mechanism is the specific mechanism, embodying the authentication type and location of authentication. In FIG. 4 the protocol proxies **326a, 326c** reside, respectively, with the authentication mechanisms **318a, 318c**; and the protocol proxy **326b** resides with the

20   authentication agent **324**.

If a subject **312** wants to use a server application **314**, the process begins with the subject **312** contacting the authentication agent **324**. The authentication agent **324** uses the mechanism resolution module **322** to process and resolve the name of a subject **312** (e.g., james@alico.com) to an authentication mechanism **318a** (for instance). The authentication agent **324** then uses the

25   protocol proxy **326a** (used as an example now) to facilitate passing of credentials between the subject **312** and the authentication mechanism **318a**. Note that the authentication agent **324** does not see any sensitive credentials that the subject **312** passes to the protocol proxy **326a** (e.g., passwords). The subject **312** and the protocol proxy **326a** each establish a secure tunnel. Thus, for mechanisms that require knowledge of sensitive credentials it is best to co-locate the proxy at

30   the authentication mechanism, as is shown in FIG. 4 for the authentication mechanism **318a** and protocol proxy **326a**.

The subject **312** and the protocol proxy **326a** engage in the process of authentication. If the subject **312** is authentic, then the protocol proxy **326a** produces a digitally signed document consisting of a name assertion and entitlements. In the inventors' presently preferred embodiment, the actual format of the document is according to the security services markup

5   language (S2ML), which is a draft XML standard for communicating security information. Once the subject **312** receives the S2ML document it can pass it to any application that understands the simple S2ML elements and attributes. If necessary, for any application (e.g., the server application **314** in FIG. 4) that does not understand S2ML, an XML adapter **328** can be used to provide this capability.

10   The power of FAST **10** lies in its simplicity and in its inherent security. Components of FAST **10** can be deployed in a number of ways, yielding deployment scenarios that simultaneously meet security and business requirements of organizations.

The mechanism resolution module caries out a process which takes into account the environment within which the subject is operating. For example, asking the subject for

15   credentials through a hand held device would be more different than obtaining such with a retina-scanning device. Thus, a subject can authenticate in whatever manner desired, leading to a more positive experience.

The authentication mechanisms need not be modified. Instead, the protocol proxies interface between the authentication agent and the authentication mechanisms. As a result,

20   organizations can quickly leverage their existing authentication mechanisms, leading to cost savings and protection of their investments.

Authentication is decoupled from the applications. This permits organizations to change their underlying authentication mechanisms, either incrementally or all at once, without ever needing to modify their own or third party applications used by their own subjects.

25   The authentication mechanisms run at the location that owns them (i.e., within their boundary of administrative control). The exchange of information between an authentication mechanism and a subject is private. Therefore, the authentication agent can never see or steal sensitive credentials.

The subjects need not be just human users. They can be applications, devices, processes,

30   etc. As a result, FAST **10** is applicable in multiple environments, involving human and non-human subjects.

Because the components of FAST **10** can run anywhere, and because these components can be under different domains of control, it is imperative that each individual component be secure, both internally and in its communication with other components. This total security of FAST **10** is now discussed.

With continued reference to FIG. 4, the authentication agent **324** mediates authentication requests and responses between the subject **312** and the protocol proxy **326a**. However, in no case can the authentication agent **324** view secret credentials. The reason for this is that the subject **312** and the protocol proxy **326a** set up a secret key that is not known to the authentication agent **324**. Additionally, the authentication agent **324** cannot modify the result of the authentication (the S2ML name assertion and entitlement). The reason for this is that the protocol proxy **326a** digitally signs the authentication response.

In the example of the FAST 10 depicted in FIG. 4, a dashed line depicts the boundary of the agent domain **330** and it can be seen that all communication between the subject 312 and the protocol proxies **326a, 326b, 326c** passes through the agent domain 330. Nonetheless, even this arrangement is secure for the reasons just described.

The protocol proxy establishes a secure protocol with the subject **312**. The protocol proxy can run co-resident with the authentication agent **324** (as protocol proxy **326b** does in FIG. 4), or co-resident with an authentication mechanism (as protocol proxy **326a** does with the authentication mechanism **318a** in FIG. 4). If the subject **312** is supplying sensitive credentials, it is best for the protocol proxy to run co-resident with the authentication agent **324**.

The protocol proxies produce signed S2ML name assertions and entitlements. The subject **312** can use the S2ML document to authenticate to any server (e.g., the server application **314**). In this respect, there is an important difference between FAST **10** and other authentication architectures. In other authentication architectures (e.g., Kerberos) the name assertion is targeted for a specific server. As such, the server cannot steal the name assertion. However, the subject in such a scheme would need a different name assertion for every server.

In order to protect the S2ML document from being replayed or stolen, the protocol proxy delivers a SRP secret to the subject, and includes a SRP verifier for the server application in the S2ML document. In this manner the server can always verify that the subject was the original and intended recipient of the S2ML document, but the server can never use the S2ML document to pose as the subject. In summary, the S2ML name assertion and entitlement is analogous to a

digital certificate that the application server can only use to authenticate the subject.

The authentication mechanisms do not directly communicate with any other component of FAST **10**. Instead, the protocol proxies are the interface between the authentication mechanisms and the other components of FAST **10**. Thus, the communication between a protocol proxy and an authentication mechanism can be as secure as desired.

FAST **10** may employ widely used and trusted security industry standards. For instance, X.509 version 3 digital certificates may be used. The components of FAST **10** can use such digital certificates as the basis for SSL/TLS connections and for digital signature verification. As noted above, security services markup language (S2ML) may also be used. The protocol proxies can produce XML documents that comply with S2ML schema. XML digital signatures are another standard which may be used. FAST **10** may use XML-signature specifications for production of digital signatures in S2ML name assertions and entitlements. The use of the secure remote password (SRP) standard permits FAST to uses the SRP authentication and key exchange system, as specified in RFC 2945. Furthermore, the enhanced version of SRP described herein provides additional benefits. FAST **10** may also use various standard encryption and message digest algorithms for protecting the privacy and integrity of its protocol data. These may include Diffie-Hellman, RSA, AES, SHA-1, and keyed-hashing for message authentication, as defined in RFC 2104.

The ability to share information across enterprise boundaries enables organizations to create inter-enterprise business and to gain a competitive advantage. Simultaneously, information constitutes an important corporate asset and must be protected commensurate with its value. In order to protect information, organizations need to ascertain the identity of users.

In the real world each one of us is known and authenticated in many ways. Our friends and families know us by our voices or likeness, financial and legal institutions know us by our signatures and officially issued identifications, and law enforcement institutions know us by our fingerprints.

Global single sign-on does not mean a single source of authentication, nor does it mean a single type of authentication. It is the effective use of multiple, federated authentication sources that ultimately leads to global single sign-on.

FAST **10** is the only technology today that permits use of multiple authentication types and multiple authentication sources from different domains of control. By using FAST **10**,

organizations can satisfy the most stringent security requirements while leveraging their existing information systems to quickly implement business relationships.

While various embodiments have been described above, it should be understood that they have been presented by way of example only, and not limitation. Thus, the breadth and scope of 5 the invention should not be limited by any of the above described exemplary embodiments, but should be defined only in accordance with the following claims and their equivalents.

INDUSTRIAL APPLICABILITY

The present FAST **10** is well suited for use to authenticate subjects **20, 118, 120, 212, 312** to server applications **38, 124, 126, 314**. As shown in FIG. 2, this can be on a small scale, for just a few subjects and server applications, or this can be on a very large scale, for potentially thousands, as depicted in FIG. 3. These are current needs which FAST **10** well serves, and ones which FAST **10** may be immediately implimented to serve.

FAST **10** permits the use of multiple authentication types and multiple authentication sources from different domains of control, regardless of how disharmonious these may be. FAST **10** simply abstracts both authentication type and source. Accordingly, organizations can satisfy the most stringent security requirements, choosing security infrastructure as they wish or leveraging their existing ones to quickly implement business relationships.

The ability to support multiple types of authentication permits organizations to deploy one authentication type and migrate to other types as desired, say, as their needs grow or as more robust types emerge. Existing authentication technologies, such as Kerberos or public key infrastructure, require all users and servers to be enabled with that technology. The result is an all-or-none proposition for the entire enterprise. Using FAST **10**, an organization can change its authentication mechanism without affecting its users or servers.

The ability to support multiple authentication sources permits users and service providers to choose where to authenticate. For example, in order to pay a bill a user would have to authenticate with his bank. However, in order to view medical records a user would have to authenticate with her healthcare provider, or perhaps her employer.

FAST **10** permits production and verification of signatures using name assertions. This eliminates the need to use digital certificates for production and verification of signatures, which improves the speed and efficiency of signature production and verification. Name assertions may be used as a basis to renew an existing name assertion. This eliminates the need to use digital certificates every time authentication is needed, which improves on the speed and efficiency of the authentication process.

As has been described, FAST **10** may employ and enhance the utility of Kerberos, the public key infrastructure (PKI) scheme, or particularly the secure remote password (SRP) protocol, improving upon it by implementing a strong, mutual authentication protocol.

FAST **10** is inherently secure. It permits a hierarchy of trust wherein authenticating mechanisms must authenticate themselves. In this manner, a subject need only reveal sensitive credentials to and only trust assertions of an authentic mechanisms. FAST **10** also permits flexible credential expiration, overcoming limitations of prior architectures, which are rigid about who sets the expiration time of credentials. FAST **10** permits credential expiration to be requested by the client, the server, or the mechanism.

For the above, and other, reasons, it is expected that the FAST **10** of the present invention will have widespread industrial applicability. Therefore, it is expected that the commercial utility of the present invention will be extensive and long lasting.

GLOSSARY

Authentication Agent:

    A process that facilitates authentication between a Subject and an Authentication

5   Mechanism. The Authentication Agent itself never authenticates a Subject.

Authentication Mechanism:

    A process that authenticates a Subject according to a specific protocol.

Administrative Domain:

    The set of devices, people and processes under the control of the same entity.

10   Boundary of Administrative Control:

    The boundary between Administrative Domains.

Client:

    A process that a Subject uses to authenticate itself.

Client applet:

15   A specific implementation of a Client where the authentication code can be downloaded

    dynamically, or reside locally on the client, and run in a browser.

Client application:

    A specific implementation of a Client where the authentication code resides on the client

    and runs as a stand-alone process.

20   Credentials:

    Data that is presented to establish claimed identity.

Entitlement:

    A data structure that contains access decision information. A Server uses Entitlements to

    determine what a Subject can do.

25   Mechanism-Authenticating; Mechanism:

    An Authentication Mechanism that can authenticate other Authentication Mechanisms as

    its Subjects.

Mechanism Registration:

    A process that an Authentication Mechanism uses to register itself in the Mechanism

30   Repository.

Mechanism Repository:

A repository containing information about Authentication Mechanisms. The information

includes type of mechanism, its protocol, its strength, and how a Client can contact it.

Mechanism Resolution:

The process that maps certain information about a Subject (e.g., name and Realm) to a set

of Authentication Mechanisms.

Name Assertion:

A signed data structure containing a declaration of identity. A Name Assertion is

presented to establish a claimed identity. A Name Assertion is a type of Credential.

Protocol Proxy:

A process that mediates between two other processes which do not understand each

other's protocol.

Domain:

A realm of authentication authority. An Authentication Mechanism can authenticate

Subjects in one or more domains.

Server:

A process that provides service to a Subject through a Client. Servers require Subjects to

authenticate themselves. In some cases Servers must also authenticate themselves to the

Client/Subject.

Server Application:

An application that implements the functionality of a Server process. Usually, Server and

Server Application are synonymous.

Strength:

An indication of the rigor of authentication.

Subject:

A user, application, device, process or any other entity that requires Authentication.

APPENDIX A

1.   This is an example of an authentication request going from the client **22** to the protocol proxy **34**.

```
<AuthRequest xmlns="http://ns.s2ml.org/s2ml">
    <ID>urn:PasswordAuthenticatorApplet:e58bd988ee:1</ID>
    <Date>2001-03-29T11:23:773-08:00</Date>
    <Credentials>
        <SecureLogin xmlns="http://sigaba.com/2000/12/sigabanet/fast">
            <Name>logan@sigaba.com</Name>
            <Realm>SIGABA.COM</Realm>
            <A>
            BV+2pKUEf0i1I57/TIXlRzSkbIi7+lhhWhSOuhglBoA0cAo6FxM111RWIS
G9iB0EEUPC+pplhTmzK1OsbVMs/TWGcBPuJVGX5lzhD3Far7Ozx3cIUU50AjGdr+HVwBt
4KJz4E8NrSZKs5fHBoefY3ykaGcKBezeyo5KN+Xx7mWQ=
            </A>
        </SecureLogin>
    </Credentials>
</AuthRequest>
```

2.   This is an example of an authentication response from the protocol proxy **34** to the client **22**. As you can seen, this example contains a name assertion for the protocol proxy **34** (i.e. this is the protocol proxy **34** providing its own name assertion to the client **22**).

```
<AuthResponse xmlns="http://ns.s2ml.org/s2ml">
    <ID>urn:AuthenticationServlet:e58bd98307:1</ID>
    <Date>2001-03-29T11:23:302-08:00</Date>
    <InResponseTo>urn:PasswordAuthenticatorApplet:e58bd988ee:1</InResponseTo>
    <Result>NotEnoughInfo</Result>
    <SecureLoginChallenge xmlns="http://sigaba.com/2000/12/sigabanet/fast">
        <ESRP>
            <PasswordDerivative>
```

```
<function>Sigaba SHA-1 Scheme</function>
    <salt>h3D4qARuHQg=</salt>
</PasswordDerivative>
<NameAssertion xmlns="http://ns.s2ml.org/s2ml">
    <ID>urn:mechanism/AuthenticationServlet:e58bd98307@SIGABA.COM:0</ID>

    <Issuer>mechanism/AuthenticationServlet:e58bd98307@SIGABA.COM</Issuer>

    <Date>2001-03-29T11:23:840-08:00</Date>
    <Audiences>urn:*</Audiences>
    <ValidityInterval>
        <NotBefore>2001-03-29T10:23:840-08:00</NotBefore>
        <NotAfter>2001-03-30T11:23:840-08:00</NotAfter>
    </ValidityInterval>
    <AuthData>
        <AuthType>Login</AuthType>
        <UserHandle>mechanism/AuthenticationServlet:e58bd98307@SIGABA.COM</UserHandle>
        <IdentityToken>
        <dh-public-value xmlns="http://sigaba.com/2001/1/common/security">
            <BigInteger>AOmstRClilTNQ8sbRHIrhVxcBK6SAYWdlMMIyR6MJKr
SiU/qhZcfYTWSGb0ni9MBDsnkdVBsa+/DA6PpjI45YhsCLi/ZExOMbqKSwLx2wp84Hu+s5S
a9XA+yTcA/WgzRTF+hjErU1fSImgyYWd7326zA01D/WMhubYh+XM7nYgKv</BigInteger>
            <BigInteger>Ag==</BigInteger>
            <int>128</int>
            <BigInteger>Jfb2Mlif982CLj9sw0/0xgFVGpoICAlJejFE+VCTwymT0T
K4HunAtWcSs0PXfYv1agUlye0arQ+8OX0nKPV5dQjQP3oyuFVybeYHBSPQQD5RTY0Pkk
FW/EU8iqcxNQcjvMYSu+oT9f60+t78B61vkQvE08c1NoH5Ueoq W8Yyuig=</BigInteger>
        </dh-public-value>
        </IdentityToken>
    </AuthData>
```

<Signature xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">

<SignedInfo>

<CanonicalizationMethod

algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2000/CR-xml-c14n-20001026"></CanonicalizationMethod>

5   <SignatureMethod

algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#dsa-sha1"></SignatureMethod>

<Reference uri="#xpointer(../../../..)">

<Transforms>

<Transform algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2000/CR-xml-

10   c14n-20001026"></Transform>

</Transforms>

<DigestMethod

algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1">

<DigestValue>X3ZywSCxXHQKP6v9+/6r62/LGHc=</DigestValue>

15   </DigestMethod>

</Reference>

</SignedInfo>

<SignatureValue>

RecJwLPgKpdMGMXlpoi0X8RPGgiQiH/OdzznUMGEpF/eRvb5I1ij

20   mQ==

</SignatureValue>

<KeyInfo>

<KeyValue>

<DSAKeyValue>

25   <P>AOmstRClilTNQ8sbRHIrhVxcBK6SAYWdlMMIyR6MJ

KrSiU/qhZcfYTWSGb0ni9MBDsnkdVBsa+/DA6PpjI45YhsCLi/ZExOMbqKSwLx2wp84Hu+s

5Sa9XA+yTcA/WgzRTF+hjErU1fSImgyYWd7326zA01D/WMhubYh+XM7nYgKv</P>

<Q>ANnezYYG5JOCcSNre+pJztsNA2n9</Q>

<G>AKWsWEe8wT1KkMIi+u05wZhODK4U0ZnutBGSY+4

30   LtLl++EW6E5AcEy8dbR9V4HWU32tQUyZwIikvChkfRXnjRP1/kPsNiAXUCU1AqxL6f1YZl

W5zztXZCBs8iSLqF3EOzoUXm5Kqx5TfoTmCvZiM2nYxL6Q9hRZKwgJpC3AnzFbu</G>

<Y>BPT2HnTOBMfvFZb8UDn6fQ19gFkOsjGGZGGBRRhw
8Kyr06espL34MEavYnwwGW6D1VWbvIuaDHtUfRv6znkwzg0iCtsSnQ2FLD+rpsEQHok7pz
+UWDV4L5u4mhqzWWX3EiJmniOoxQduxqHjsbXm3XMqByWmeJOCVRIVeNa7Msw=</Y
>

5   </DSAKeyValue>

                          </KeyValue>

                          </KeyInfo>

                          </Signature>

                     </NameAssertion>

10   <B>

                          U7X7D6daFmx2QTc91hHMjGTQlGHfFIJoorQoPSshiKF8XR0bnOOJP8
lGOA8SjEtH7iatb68jJLmhw3vBeGCV3EEanHQoig1pIsB0gFjOvLHphb+22JEi0CHTBaMmN
Kijc9/z8U27GnY6BSRbTkXjyMQsqt/AVKo0SxWVloKdtZw=

                          </B>

                          <s>ANzxWWHwWH5MCaak8jVVBTA=</s>

                     </ESRP>

                </SecureLoginChallenge>

           </AuthResponse>

20   3.   This is a "continuation" of the request from example 1, above, (i.e., the second message

sent from the client **22** to the protocol proxy **34**).

      <AuthRequest xmlns="http://ns.s2ml.org/s2ml">

           <ID>urn:PasswordAuthenticatorApplet:e58bd988ee:2</ID>

           <Date>2001-03-29T11:23:651-08:00</Date>

25   <InResponseTo>urn:AuthenticationServlet:e58bd98307:1</InResponseTo>

           <Credentials>

                <SecureLogin xmlns="http://sigaba.com/2000/12/sigabanet/fast">

                     <ESRP>

                          <r>OUqDVi6xfDquAJJoiX6TMQ==</r>

30   <proof>Kq4wU50gR8lmM1LWlgsRX6AjdWI=</proof>

                     </ESRP>

```
            <encrypted>

            Jj2hQq0rgYLmuX2Nvml3pdz0m4pADLh7C1AtKDcbjkLWjL3XRbPTRMjEtqe

5/xDzFTpvUr/QbMs1PAs46awwvqHJrlJJj33DDObHa0oFdsJkcuk8oBwoHgswu9UKNhD2+TY

AY5A1XVHYRGgDPw2fNw==

5           </encrypted>

            </SecureLogin>

        </Credentials>

        <Signature xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">

            <SignedInfo>

10              <CanonicalizationMethod algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2000/CR-xml-

c14n-20001026"></CanonicalizationMethod>

                <SignatureMethod algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#hmac-

sha1"></SignatureMethod>

                <Reference uri="#xpointer(../../../..)">

                    <Transforms>

15                      <Transform algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2000/CR-xml-c14n-

20001026"></Transform>

                    </Transforms>

                    <DigestMethod algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1">

20                      <DigestValue>6b2BeIg9NdacKv3icawD6Gc5sQI=</DigestValue>

                    </DigestMethod>

                </Reference>

            </SignedInfo>

            <SignatureValue>lnZ21+ccWFSKb+e8vp8FRmF+HfE=</SignatureValue>

25      </Signature>

    </AuthRequest>
```

4.   This is the second response from the protocol proxy **34** to the client **22**. This response

contains encrypted name assertion and entitlements on the <encrypted > element.

30   <AuthResponse xmlns="http://ns.s2ml.org/s2ml">

        <ID>urn:AuthenticationServlet:e58bd98307:2</ID>

```
<Date>2001-03-29T11:23:082-08:00</Date>
<InResponseTo>urn:PasswordAuthenticatorApplet:e58bd988ee:2</InResponseTo>
<Result>Success</Result>
<ESRP xmlns="http://sigaba.com/2000/12/sigabanet/fast">
    <proof>fpOoMrfTFPtixO+Py/VnL2wYbK4=</proof>
</ESRP>
<encrypted xmlns="http://sigaba.com/2000/12/sigabanet/fast">
+hTqqvIfr5fjWDnmezmdSPC8ZOMFnTbheg7hRjgL5X8pTzQ5kF/orOxnzx3x9S/J
```

… [Encrypted data omited for brevity here.] …

```
p9BPevCysg6Yq8iWk3Y6XWHH5/lrzavFn64S5EzLpgGriKySupof4EvOfrdPaP33
</encrypted>
<Signature xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
    <SignedInfo>
        <CanonicalizationMethod algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2000/CR-xml-
c14n-20001026"></CanonicalizationMethod>
        <SignatureMethod algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#hmac-
sha1"></SignatureMethod>
        <Reference uri="#xpointer(../../../..)">
            <Transforms>
                <Transform algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2000/CR-xml-c14n-
20001026"></Transform>
            </Transforms>
            <DigestMethod algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1">
                <DigestValue>Rke9WGLhQ1BwfsyAqHV2p5J2Kz8=</DigestValue>
            </DigestMethod>
        </Reference>
    </SignedInfo>
    <SignatureValue>wvJCJcGhQ/W3UKhoJAGnS2T8nK8=</SignatureValue>
</Signature>
```

</AuthResponse>

5.   This is simply a clear-text version of the <encrypted> element in example 4, above.

```
<NameAssertion xmlns="http://ns.s2ml.org/s2ml">
    <ID>urn:mechanism/SigAuthServlet:e587bfe6c7@SIGABA.COM:3d</ID>
    <Issuer>mechanism/SigAuthServlet:e587bfe6c7@SIGABA.COM</Issuer>
    <Date>2001-03-29T11:19:980-08:00</Date>
    <Audiences>urn:*</Audiences>
    <ValidityInterval>
        <NotBefore>2001-03-29T10:19:980-08:00</NotBefore>
        <NotAfter>2001-03-29T19:19:980-08:00</NotAfter>
    </ValidityInterval>
    <AuthData>
        <AuthType>Login</AuthType>
        <UserHandle>logan@sigaba.com@SIGABA.COM</UserHandle>
        <Aliases>logan@gedanken.org@SIGABA.COM,logan@sigaba.com@SIGABA.CO
M,enterprise@sigaba.com@SIGABA.COM,engineering@sigaba.com@SIGABA.COM,enterpri
se-
tech@sigaba.com@SIGABA.COM,all@sigaba.com@SIGABA.COM,fastlist@sigaba.com@SI
GABA.COM</Aliases>
        <IdentityToken>
            <dh-public-value xmlns="http://sigaba.com/2001/1/common/security">
                <BigInteger>AOmstRClilTNQ8sbRHIrhVxcBK6SAYWdlMMIyR6MJKrSiU
/qhZcfYTWSGb0ni9MBDsnkdVBsa+/DA6PpjI45YhsCLi/ZExOMbqKSwLx2wp84Hu+s5Sa9X
A+yTcA/WgzRTF+hjErU1fSImgyYWd7326zA01D/WMhubYh+XM7nYgKv</BigInteger>
                <BigInteger>Ag==</BigInteger>
                <int>128</int>
                <BigInteger>AMGVIvdII0GwAKE05VLkECE9CrgYLXtNfPxPzNgBLQIp
WCqzXvnP29itL6zkoczpS1Oi+zIL9RFxI37MCkvuNxqCtIykq4XGLAf/PeIPEWNPz9xK3Qvpk
Br1yQChIvTuTktLTM+/sQePUwk0LMt/Sy43QDXhyP4Awytucc29k21l</BigInteger>
            </dh-public-value>
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</IdentityToken>
</AuthData>
<Signature xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
<SignedInfo>
<CanonicalizationMethod algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2000/CR-xml-
c14n-20001026"></CanonicalizationMethod>
<SignatureMethod algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#dsa-
sha1"></SignatureMethod>
<Reference uri="#xpointer(../../../..)">
<Transforms>
<Transform algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2000/CR-xml-c14n-
20001026"></Transform>
</Transforms>
<DigestMethod algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1">
<DigestValue>BnsirjWjSnsNx+ui75eSnCfLK/4=</DigestValue>
</DigestMethod>
</Reference>
</SignedInfo>
<SignatureValue>hjRVhP2sQAwnOZcj/w7WnDxZJuktp2IYX3wF3j8sAEoUkLxuxAkO
SA==</SignatureValue>
<KeyInfo>
<KeyValue>
<DSAKeyValue>
<P>AOmstRCIilTNQ8sbRHIrhVxcBK6SAYWdlMMIyR6MJKrSiU/qhZ
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TcA/WgzRTF+hjErU1fSImgyYWd7326zA01D/WMhubYh+XM7nYgKv</P>
<Q>ANnezYYG5JOCcSNre+pJztsNA2n9</Q>
<G>AKWsWEe8wT1KkMIi+u05wZhODK4U0ZnutBGSY+4LtLl++EW
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Bs8iSLqF3EOzoUXm5Kqx5TfoTmCvZiM2nYxL6Q9hRZKwgJpC3AnzFbu</G>
<Y>BPT2HnTOBMfvFZb8UDn6fQ19gFkOsjGGZGGBRRhw8Kyr06esp
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L34MEavYnwwGW6D1VWbvIuaDHtUfRv6znkwzg0iCtsSnQ2FLD+rpsEQHok7pz+UWDV4L

5u4mhqzWWX3EiJmniOoxQduxqHjsbXm3XMqByWmeJOCVRIVeNa7Msw=</Y>

        </DSAKeyValue>

      </KeyValue>

5   </KeyInfo>

    </Signature>

  </NameAssertion>

  <Entitlement xmlns="http://ns.s2ml.org/s2ml">

10   <ID>urn:mechanism/SigAuthServlet:e587bfe6c7@SIGABA.COM:3d:0</ID>

    <Issuer>mechanism/SigAuthServlet:e587bfe6c7@SIGABA.COM</Issuer>

    <Date>2001-03-29T11:19:980-08:00</Date>

    <Audiences>urn:*</Audiences>

    <ValidityInterval>

15   <NotBefore>2001-03-29T10:19:980-08:00</NotBefore>

      <NotAfter>2001-03-29T19:19:980-08:00</NotAfter>

    </ValidityInterval>

    <DependsOn>urn:mechanism/SigAuthServlet:e587bfe6c7@SIGABA.COM:3d</Depend

sOn>

20   <AzData>

      <ks-info xmlns="http://sigaba.com/2000/12/sigabanet/sigauth">

      <ks-info host="minnie.ironsite.com" id="0" ip="63.202.162.58"></ks-info>

      </ks-info>

    </AzData>

25   <Signature xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">

      <SignedInfo>

        <CanonicalizationMethod algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2000/CR-xml-

c14n-20001026"></CanonicalizationMethod>

        <SignatureMethod algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#dsa-

30 sha1"></SignatureMethod>

        <Reference uri="#xpointer(../../../..)">

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<Transforms>
    <Transform algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2000/CR-xml-c14n-
20001026"></Transform>
    </Transforms>
    <DigestMethod algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1">
        <DigestValue>1yMLZu/99bWEnSIfV1soodcddTk=</DigestValue>
    </DigestMethod>
    </Reference>
</SignedInfo>
<SignatureValue>I6094fFSSCdbRS3HSEEjf2nlyDeapzMB/NHjJs5y9HX9XvhwfVg
OoQ==</SignatureValue>
<KeyInfo>
    <KeyValue>
    <DSAKeyValue>
        <P>AOmstRClilTNQ8sbRHIrhVxcBK6SAYWdlMMIyR6MJKrSiU/qhZ
cfYTWSGb0ni9MBDsnkdVBsa+/DA6PpjI45YhsCLi/ZExOMbqKSwLx2wp84Hu+s5Sa9XA+y
TcA/WgzRTF+hjErU1fSImgyYWd7326zA01D/WMhubYh+XM7nYgKv</P>
        <Q>ANnezYYG5JOCcSNre+pJztsNA2n9</Q>
        <G>AKWsWEe8wT1KkMIi+u05wZhODK4U0ZnutBGSY+4LtLl++EW
6E5AcEy8dbR9V4HWU32tQUyZwlikvChkfRXnjRP1/kPsNiAXUCU1AqxL6f1YZIW5zztXZC
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        <Y>BPT2HnTOBMfvFZb8UDn6fQ19gFkOsjGGZGGBRRhw8Kyr06esp
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5u4mhqzWWX3EiJmniOoxQduxqHjsbXm3XMqByWmeJOCVRIVeNa7Msw=</Y>
    </DSAKeyValue>
    </KeyValue>
</KeyInfo>
</Signature>
</Entitlement>
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